Aristotle’s conception of causality and the ones Modern philosophers have bequeathed us have been exhaustively discussed, although the contrast between them has not, in my opinion, been sufficiently highlighted. This paper proposes to fill this gap. I start with Aristotelian causality and his theses that causal explanation requires knowledge of causal laws and that the necessity associated with these laws presupposes the existence of causal powers. I discuss next Locke’s and Leibniz’s attempts to modernize Aristotle’s theses on causality. The third (...) part of the paper presents two paradoxes Hume identified, on the one hand, between Locke’s and Leibniz’s theses about our knowledge of causal laws and, on the other hand, between the Aristotelian thesis that there must be causal powers and the scientific practice of Modernity. Hume’s proposal to eliminate these paradoxes is also discussed. I finish with some critical remarks on the humean model about our knowledge of causal laws as compared with his contribution to the analysis of the concept of causality. (shrink)

En este artículo, discuto la metodología filosófica frente a los límites del sentido y de la racionalidad. Empiezo con la concepción según la cual el filósofo debería resignarse a exhibir el sinsentido de otros filósofos, pero finalmente tendría que callarse, ya que su propio discurso necesariamente sobrepasa los límites de la racionalidad. En seguida, propongo una metodología interpretativa para la filosofía en un intento de caracterizar mejor estos límites y evitar el silencio que inviabilizaría todo el discurso filosófico. Finalmente, busco (...) reconciliar la metodología filosófica interpretativa con la irracionalidad interna del filósofo apelando a una división de su mente entre el sentido común y una segunda agencia que está destinada a sobrepasarlo. Dicha esquizofrenia de la filosofía sería la única manera de entender su tarea recurrente de trazar de manera segura los límites de nuestra comprensión cotidiana del mundo. (shrink)

Does Wittgenstein have a coherent philosophy of mathematics? Here, I will be concerned with showing that the answer is positive. However, given that his life-long philosophical perspective on mathematics tends to be misleading, I focus on the specific problem posed by Paul Benacerraf in ‘Mathematical Truth’, that is: the puzzle about how to reconcile the metaphysics with the epistemology for mathematics. My aim is to show that there is an adequate anti-platonistic solution to that puzzle in the mature writings of (...) the Austrian philosopher. (shrink)